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Environmental Law-Private Remedies for Pollution of Navigable Wa-
ters
The dramatic increase in public concern about our deteriorating
environment has been reflected in numerous legislative and enforcement
activities directed at environmental protection.1 The primary thrust of
these activities has been the correction and prevention of pollution prob-
lems, leaving the courts with the principal role in compensating the
private victim of pollution.
The law of torts is a vehicle for the application-of social and eco-
nomic policy to the allocation of damages. Before pursuing the means
of re-allocating damages from pollution of navigable waters, it is essen-
tial to make a threshold decision as to whether such re-allocation is a
desirable goal. Succinctly, the question is whether the economic burden
resulting from pollution of navigable water should be borne by those
directly injured, by the public at large, or by the polluter.
It is suggested that this cost generally should be borne directly by
the one who caused the pollution. Where the polluter is an industrial
enterprise, it will redistribute the cost among those similarly engaged by
insuring against the risk, after which it and its competitors will price the
cost of the insurance into the product or service they furnish. This proc-
ess of "cost-internalization" yields a market price which reflects more
closely the true economic cost of the product or service. 2 More impor-
tant, perhaps, is the expectation that cost-internalization coupled with
the profit motivation of the industrial manager will result in significant
'Because this note is concerned with private remedies, the applicable statutes are discussed only
in the context of their utility in fashioning such remedies. Federal statutes which are related to the
problem are the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, §§ 9-20, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in and
comprising most of 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-18 (1970)); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1151-60, 1171-73 (1970); the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1161-70 (1970); and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43
(1970).
For an oil industry attorney's perspective on this legislative panoply, see Keener, Federal
Water Pollution Legislation and Regulations with Particular Reference to the Oil Industry, 4 NAT.
RES. LAW. 484 (1971). Much helpful background on legislative activity is found in Mendelsohn,
Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution-Domestic and International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1
(1969). A model state statutory scheme is discussed in Note, A Proposal to Protect Maine from
the Oilbergs of the 70's, 22 ME. L. REv. 481 (1970).
2Esposito, Air and Water Pollution: What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIv. LiB. L. REV. 32, 34-36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Esposito]; Katz, The Function
of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Katz].
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
improvements in pollution-control technology and in more aggressive
use of control tools presently available.
A survey of the present state of the law reveals that most of the
conventional theories of tort law have limitations which impair their
effectiveness when applied to water-pollution situations. 3 Negligence will
support a cause of action4 but poses serious and complex problems of
proof of fault.5 The law of nuisance,6 suggested by numerous writers as
a productive device, 7 has been rendered less effective by a judicial philo-
sophy of weighing the benefits of the polluting enterprise against the
private damage it inflicts-thus, in some cases, conferring a "license to
pollute."' The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher,9 the rule of strict liability
for damages from abnormally dangerous activities,"0 and the statutory
imposition of express strict liability" are limited to particular and spe-
cialized fact situations.
This note will suggest two alternatives which may succeed where the
above methods may fail because of their limitations. The first is the
theory of statutory fault under the Refuse Act of 1899,12 and the second
is a new form of enterprise liability called "process liability."
3For comprehensive discussions of tort law in pollution applications, see Esposito; Katz;
Reitze, Private Remedies for Environmental Wrongs, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 779 (1971).
'Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1951); State v. S.S. Bournemouth,
307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (denying motion to dismiss). A negligence action may be brought
in admiralty or on the civil side of either a federal district court or a state court.
5Reitze, supra note 3, at 810.
'For examples of recovery under nuisance theory, see Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co.,
223 N.C. 535, 27 S.E.2d 538 (1943); cf. McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 245 Ore. 247, 421
P.2d 957 (1966) (air pollution). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 89 (4th ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
7See, e.g., Esposito 35-37; Katz 608-22; Reitze, supra note 3, at 799-807; Note, Private Reme-
dies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 734 (1970).
ISee, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d
312 (1970); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
9L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (strict liability for damages resulting from a non-natural use of land).
See also Katz at 642.
"See Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) (driller held liable
under this doctrine when oil well "blew out" in a developed area ashore). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND) oFToRTs §§ 519-20 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
"See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970) (strict liability for oil spills).
1233 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). Because repeated references will be made to the statute later in this
note, this section is set out here with certain omissions:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit. . . from or out of any. . . floating
craft of any kind, or from the shore . . . any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a
liquid state, into any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary of any
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The doctrine of liability based on violation of statutory law is well
established.13 Despite this, the relatively recent adoption of many statutes
concerning water pollution accounts for a shortage of cases in which this
theory of recovery has been advanced. There is, however, an old statute
which may afford a very real opportunity for relief to the private plain-
tiff if an interesting anomaly in its application can be overcome. The
statute is the venerable Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.14 The anomaly
is that two of the basic sections of the Act have given rise to private
remedies while the third section has not. Unhappily, it is the pollution
prohibition section of the Rivers and Harbors Act, commonly called the
Refuse Act,'5 which has failed to support a private cause of action based
on statutory fault. It should do so. To show why, it is necessary to look
at the three major sections of the Rivers and Harbors Act and the
judicial treatment they have received.
Section ten 6 of the Rivers and Harbors Act prohibits the obstruc-
tion, dredging, or filling of navigable waters without a permit from the
Chief of the Corps of Engineers. There is no express provision for private
remedies. Through application of the doctrine of statutory fault, viola-
tion of the statute has given rise to an implied cause of action for
damages resulting from the unlawful conduct. 7
The second major provision of the Rivers and Harbors Act is sec-
tion fifteen,'8 the so-called "Wreck Statute." Section fifteen makes it
unlawful to sink or allow a vessel to sink "voluntarily or carelessly" and
imposes an affirmative duty to mark any wreck. It also requires that the
owner commence removal of the wreck immediately or be considered to
navigable water. . . ; and it shall not be lawful to deposit. . . material of any kind in
any place on the bank of any navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary. . . where
the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water. . . whereby navigation
shall or may be impeded or obstructed. . . andprovided. . . That the Secretary of the
Army [may issue permits for the discharge of refuse].
'
3PRossCR § 36. The essence of the theory is that violation of a criminal statute or ordinance
gives rise to a civil cause of action against the violator by any person who is within the class to be
protected by the statute and whose injury results from the violation. The evidentiary effect of the
violation ranges from mere evidence of negligence to negligence per se.
"Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, §§ 9-20, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified in and comprising most of
33 U.S.C. §§ 401-18 (1970)).
1533 U.S.C. § 407 (1970). See note 12supra.
1633 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
'1Lauritzen v. Chesapeake Bay Bridge & Tunnel Dist., 259 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1966);
William B. Patton Towing Co. v. Spiller, 440 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (violation held to
constitute contributory fault).
1833 U.S.C. § 409 (1970).
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have abandoned it to the United States. In the latter event, the respon-
sibility for removal shifts to the United States.
Since 1927, failure to mark a wreck has constituted statutory fault
which results in the imposition of civil liability on the owner when other
vessels collide with the wreck. 9 The removal-or-abandonment provision
of section fifteen has travelled a more tortuous route to civil liability.
Until 1967, the owner's liability terminated when he abandoned the
wreck.2" In that year the spectacular case of Wyandotte Co. v. United
States,2' involving a lethal cargo of chlorine in a barge negligently sunk
in the Mississippi River, reached the Supreme Court. The Court held the
owner liable in personam to the federal government for three million
dollars in removal costs. Thus encouraged, the Fifth Circuit in 1970 took
the next step and imposed continuing liability based on statutory fault
on an owner whose submerged wreck was struck by another vessel.
22
Thus, since the courts have consistently allowed private recovery for
damages resulting from violations of those sections of the Rivers and
Harbors Act dealing with obstructions and wrecks, it would seem rea-
sonable to expect that they would allow recovery under section thirteen,
the Refuse Act, as well. Contrary to these expectations, the limited case
law at this point seems to weigh against this proposition.2
Section thirteen contains two prohibitions. The first proscribes the
deposit or discharge of refuse into navigable waters or their tributaries.
The second makes unlawful the placing of refuse on the banks of such
waters when the refuse may subsequently wash into the water and inter-
fere with navigation. United States v. Republic Steel Corp.24 gave the
Supreme Court an opportunity to rule on the question of civil liability
under the Refuse Act. The Court found a violation of section thirteen,
but the judgment was based principally on the application of section ten
19Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 675 (1927).
"United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 319 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1963); accord, United States
v. Zubik, 295 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1961).
21389 U.S. 191 (1967).
22Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Tug Crochet, 422 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1970).
7rhe Refuse Act has given rise to a flurry of litigation in which environmentalists have
attempted to bring qui tam actions to enforce the criminal sanctions of the Act, but the courts have
consistently closed the door on these efforts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest
Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971) and cases cited therein, 327 F. Supp. at 93; Bass Angler
Sportsman Soc. v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala. 1971), affd tntem. sub
nom., Bass Angler Sportsman Soc. v. Koppers Co., 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971).
-362 U.S. 482 (1960) (5-4 decision).
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and the finding of an obstruction to navigation.21 Dicta appear in two
federal district court opinions to the effect that violation of the Refuse
Act will not give rise to a civil cause of action.21 In another instance, a
federal district court held that no cause of action was stated where a pier
had deteriorated to the point of releasing debris which damaged a neigh-
boring pier.27 The rationale was that interference with navigation is a
necessary element of a violation of the second clause of section thirteen.
The plaintiff in the latter case then brought suit in a state court, alleging
the magic words "interference with navigation," and the Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld the cause of action based on violation of the
federal statute.28
In addition to the Minnesota case, the Fifth Circuit apparently
endorsed the theory of a private right of action based on violation of the
Refuse Act in Acme Boat Rentals, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co.29
The language of the court, however, was "negligence and statutory
fault," 3 which leaves room for speculation as to whether the case might
have stood independently on negligence under the general maritime law.
In addition, the federal government has been allowed to bring a civil
action to enjoin pollution under the first clause of section thirteen. 1
Against this background, two federal district courts have ruled
quite recently on the private remedies question. Both denied a private
cause of action based on violation of the Refuse Act in the absence of
interference with navigation. One of the cases provides no explanation
for its holding,3 2 but the other, Guthrie v. Alabama By-Products Co.,3
warrants analysis and criticism.
The plaintiffs in Guthrie were riparian property owners who
claimed a loss of property values as a result of pollution from industrial
waste discharged by the defendants. The heart of the court's reasoning
11Jd. at 492.
2United States v. Bigan, 170 F. Supp. 219, 224 (W.D. Pa. 1959); Maier v. Publicker Commer-
cial Alcohol Co., 62 F. Supp. 161, 164 (E.D. Pa. 1945), affd per curiam, 154 F.2d 1020 (3d Cir.
1946).
"H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 154 F.2d 205 (8th Cir. 1946).
21H. Christiansen & Sons, Inc. v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 31 N.W.2d 270 (1948).
"424 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1970).
3Id. at 395.
3"United States v. Armco Steel Corp., No. CA 70-H-1335 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 1971) (3 E.R.C.
1067).
"2Lavagnino v. Porto-Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971).
m328 F. Supp. 1140 (N.D. Ala. 1971).
19711
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in granting a motion to dismiss was that the legislative history of the
Refuse Act indicates that protection of navigation was the sole purpose
of its enactment and that those who are damaged by pollution alone
without concomitant interference with navigation are not within the
class of persons to be protected by the Act." Some dicta in the opinion
suggest that adequate remedies exist in "local statutory and common
law" or perhaps in further federal legislation. 6
The Guthrie court's interpretation of the Refuse Act and its legisla-
tive history is clearly at odds with the language of the Act itself, prior
judicial interpretations, current legislative attitude, and current adminis-
trative application.
The Refuse Act contains two express and separate prohibitions.37
The first forbids the discharge of refuse into navigable waters with no
reference to interference with navigation. The second proscribes the de-
posit of refuse on banks when such refuse may subsequently wash into
the water and interfere with navigation. At the risk of over-
simplification, one could conclude that Congress would have included
the qualifying clause as to interference with navigation in the first prohi-
bition had it intended to so narrow its scope.3 8 Thus, the language of the
statute itself may have made the court's resort to legislative history
superfluous.
Even if the Act is unclear, prior judicial interpretations are not. The
Supreme Court upheld a criminal prosecution under the Refuse Act
where the refuse discharged in no wise affected navigation, 3 explaining
that "it is plain from its legislative history that the 'serious injury' to
our watercourses . .. sought to be remedied was caused in part by
obstacles that impeded navigation and in part by pollution . . .-.
This interpretation has been followed consistently in criminal prosecu-
tions brought under the Refuse Act."
3Id. at 1146-47.
Id. at 1145.
uId. at 1149.
31See text of the statute note 12 supra.
"See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970), in which
the court states, "But the fact remains that the part of the statute under which defendant is charged
says nothing about effects on navigation, and the vast majority of courts faced with the question
have ruled that no such limitation exists." Id. at 357.
"sUnited States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
411d. at 228-29.
"
1See, e.g., United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 329 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
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In subsequent legislation dealing with pollution, Congress has care-
fully provided that the force of the Refuse Act as an anti-pollution
measure is unimpaired.12 This strongly suggests that Congress and the
Supreme Court agree that the Act does not deal with navigation prob-
lems alone.43
Finally, the Guthrie court relied on a 1968 administrative interpre-
tation of the Act (directing that the effect on navigation was to be the
criterion for issuance of permits) 44 to support its imposition of the inter-
ference-with-navigation limitation. The current implementing regula-
tions for the permit program, 45 however, have omitted the navigation
limitation and have imposed water-quality standards as a major crite-
rion.
So the judicial scoreboard, though confusing, has to be read as
indicating that those who would not allow the private action under the
Refuse Act for pollution without a concomitant interference with navi-
gation are in the lead. But there is most certainly not yet enough judicial
authority to conclude that the ballgame is over. The clear state of the
law allowing recovery for violations of other sections of the Rivers and
Harbors Act is so inconsistent with this narrow view of the Refuse Act
that there is a sound basis for predicting that the trend of the decisions
will shift in favor of allowing the private action.4 If so, judicial defini-
tions of "refuse" as prohibited by the Act are broad enough to make
the private action very effective.4 7 The only type of pollution not unlaw-
4233 U.S.C. § 1174 (1970).
4rThis conclusion is supported by the opinion in United States v. United States Steel Corp.,
328 F. Supp. 354, 357-58 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
14328 F. Supp. at 1148, citing 33 C.F.R. § 209.395 (1968).
436 Fed. Reg. 6564-70 (1971).
"
5The Guthrie case has been appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. That court has
consistently upheld the private cause of action under the Rivers and Harbors Act. Acme Boat
Rentals, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 424 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1970); Humble Oil & Refining
Co. v. Tug Crochet, 422 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1970). Despite the fact that Guthrie. with its multiplicity
of parties, will present difficult problems of proximate cause and proof of damages, the precedents
suggest that the plaintiffs should be allowed to survive a motion to dismiss and to face their
problems of proof.
4The Refuse Act has been held to prohibit the deposit of the following: valuable liquids which
escaped through accident or negligence, United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966);
solids in suspension, United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); wooden pilings,
Acme Boat Rentals, Inc. v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 424 F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1970); liquids which
have escaped inland and flowed some distance to navigable water, United States v. Esso Standard
Oil Co., 375 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1967); chicken entrails, United States v. Map!ewood Poultry Co.,
327 F. Supp. 686 (D. Me. 1971); and thermal pollution, United States v. Florida Power & Light
Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391, 1392 n.l (S.D. Fla. 1970) (dictum).
1971]
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ful under the Act is liquid effluent from streets and sewers. The Supreme
Court further narrowed this exception by rejecting the argument of the
defendants in United States v. Republic Steel Corp." that liquid in-
dustrial waste from industrial sewers was exempt.
Assuming that the courts can be persuaded to accept the statutory
fault concept, 49 the plaintiff must contend with common law rules in its
application." The most stringent of these requires the plaintiff to show
that he is one of those persons intended to be protected by the statute.
In addition, the evidentiary effect of the statutory violation will vary
depending on the jurisdiction, ranging from mere evidence of negligence
to irrebuttable negligence per se.51 If the damage is caused by an oil spill,
the plaintiff will probably encounter the argument that the clean-up and
financial responsibility provisions of the Water Quality Improvement
Act of 197052 supplant other remedies. 53
Beyond the generally accepted theories discussed above lie some
developing concepts in tort law which may have particular application
in attacking the problems of pollution. The related Rylands v. Fletcher
and "abnormally dangerous activity" rules, combined with some of the
elements of private nuisance, seem to blend into an amalgam which has
been described as "distinctive risk." 4 The theory is that when an actor
elects a course of conduct which, however carefully conducted, imposes
an unusual measure of risk of damage on the persons or property of
48362 U.S. 482, 490 (1960).
4 The industry which is releasing pollutants into navigable waters does indeed face problems
which warrant understanding and judicial restraint. The complexities of the federal legislative and
administrative plans are compounded by growing state activity. If the pollution prohibition in the
Refuse Act were absolute, it would be unreasonable to impose civil liability even though the firm
might be in substantial compliance with other legislation-particularly the Federal Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1161-70 (1970). This apparent harshness in the applica-
tion of statutory fault is tempered in two ways. First, the firm may apply for a permit under the
Refuse Act. Under the current regulations, the permit should issue if the applicant is complying
with the standards established under the 1970 Act. Judicial restraint could be applied if application
has been made and the failure to obtain the permit is a result of administrative delay or indecision.
Second, it is absolutely essential that the plaintiff in the civil action carry the burden of proof of
damages. The firm which is in technical violation of the Refuse Act but whose contribution to
pollution is minimal should be protected from harrassment by requiring plaintiffs to show that their
damages are a direct result of the pollution and that they are substantial.
" PRossER § 36.
51 d.
5233 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970).
OKeener, supra note 1, at 498.
mKatz, supra note 2, at 607.
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others, it is reasonable to require him to carry the economic burden of
the risk.
Similar reasoning led to the adoption of the rule of strict liability
in tort for defective products. 5 As a matter of policy, the economic cost
of injuries from defective products has been shifted from the victim of
the injury to the manufacturing enterprise. A product defect occurs when
some element of the manufacturing oi distribution process goes awry.
When an injury results, the manufacturer is held liable. Why, then,
should the enterprise which inflicts harm by a mishap in its manufactur-
ing process escape liability? Concededly, problems of establishing the
defect, proximate cause, and definition of persons to be protected are less
difficult in cases of product liability.
Nonetheless, the economic and social policies which led to develop-
ment of product liability also apply to the parallel problem of injuries
resulting from non-negligent occurrences which produce many of the
typical cases of water pollution: a faulty refinery valve, a pipeline rup-
ture, or the inadvertent grounding of a tanker. It is suggested that the
courts might fashion such a rule, imposing strict liability on the enter-
prise engaged in extraction, manufacturing or distribution when impro-
per, but non-negligent, operations produce injury to persons or prop-
erty.5 Just as product liability has been limited as to the persons pro-
tected, the type of strict process liability contemplated here would extend
only to the protection of persons and property within the scope of rea-
sonably foreseeable harm.
Until our regulatory bodies and courts have had an opportunity to
prove the effectiveness of the rash of recent legislation in controlling
pollution, the victim of pollution may be able to find adequate remedies
within the framework of existing tort law. In particular, statutory fault
under the Refuse Act may be a useful device. At some future time, it
seems probable that a general doctrine of distinctive risk, encompassing
OProsser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966).
"-Although the process liability concept is presented in this note as being new and innovative,
consider the following quotation from Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 333-34,
270 P. 952, 955 (1928):
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and proper in itself,
deliberately does an act under known conditions, and, with knowledge that injury may
result to another, proceeds, and injury is done to the other as the direct and proximate
consequence of the act, however carefully done, the one who does the act and causes the
injury should, in all fairness, be required to compensate the other for the damage done.
1971]
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many pollution-causing activities, will evolve. Finally, a form of enter-
prise liability described here as process liability should be developed as
a logical counterpart to product liability. Looking beyond the problem
of the individual victim of pollution to the larger problem of a deteriorat-
ing environment, it is at least arguable that the polluter responsible for
that deterioration will respond more positively to economic responsibil-
it3i for damages than he will to regulatory directives and modest criminal
penalties.
ROBERT D. DARDEN, JR.
